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Abstract
Political polarization combined with political turnover have been shown to am-
plify economic fluctuations (Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014). This paper analyzes a
fiscal policy institution capable of reducing the volatility caused by these politi-
cal frictions. We introduce the distinction between mandatory and discretionary
public spending in a political model of optimal fiscal policy. We show that dif-
ferent legislative nature of these components of government spending leads to a
divergent impact of mandatory and discretionary spending on politically-driven
macroeconomic volatility. Increasing the fraction of mandatory spending in total
government spending reduces the volatility; increasing the fraction of discretionary
spending has the opposite effect. The presence of the legislative requirements be-
hind the changes in mandatory public spending can explain simultaneous rise in
political polarization and decline in the U.S output volatility after the 1980s.
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1 Introduction
In democratic societies, the government role is to improve economic performance and
welfare. Periodic elections serve as disciplining mechanism that helps politicians work
towards fulfillment of socially-desirable government objectives. One problem with such
democratic arrangement is that society may not enjoy complete agreement about what
policy should be implemented by the government. Social divisions (by region, by in-
come level, or other) imply that government objectives may differ across political par-
ties representing different social groups. This phenomenon, called political polarization,
have been shown to increase economic policy uncertainty and amply business cycles
(Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014). Politically-driven fluctuations arise because of periodic
elections (political turnover) that cause shifts in government ideology (political polar-
ization). Thus, democratic political process can hinder consumption smoothing unless
there are institutions that restrict its influence on government policies.
The aim of this paper is to analyze a fiscal policy institution capable of reducing
economic fluctuations caused by these political frictions. We introduce the distinction
between mandatory and discretionary public spending in a political model of optimal
fiscal policy. Mandatory spending, which is more rigid than discretionary spending,
restricts the government’s ability to select its preferred policy. This restriction leads
to lower divergence between the fiscal variables set by alternating governments and
therefore, reduces the fluctuations caused by political frictions.
The time-series data for the U.S., where mandatory and discretionary government
outlays are explicitly defined and documented since 1962,1 exhibit trends consisted with
predictions of the model. The U.S. output volatility has declined since the 1980s even
though the political polarization has significantly increased during the same time. We
relate this decline to the presence of the legislative requirements behind the changes in
mandatory spending in the U.S., as described in our model. We calibrate the model to
match the output volatility and the structure of government spending in the U.S. during
1962–1985. We then conduct several counterfactual experiments to evaluate the impact
1Discretionary spending is defined as expenditure that is governed by annual or other periodic ap-
propriations (possible examples are defense and public order spending). Mandatory spending is defined
as expenditure that is governed by law, rather than by periodic appropriations (possible examples are
health care and social security). See, for example, Levit, Austin, and Stupak (2015).
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of political frictions and mandatory spending on output volatility in the U.S., comparing
time periods before and after 1985. According to the model, if output volatility were
caused only by political frictions and there were no legislative restrictions behind the
changes in mandatory spending, output volatility would have increased by 35% after
1985 due to increased political polarization. If output volatility were caused only by
political frictions, political polarization stayed constant, and the government faced leg-
islative requirements behind the changes in mandatory spending, output volatility would
have decreased by 25% after 1985 due to the increase in mandatory spending. A rise in
political polarization combined an increase in the fraction of mandatory spending, both
observed after 1985, can explain a decline in output volatility in the U.S. after 1985,
assuming that political frictions are the only source of volatility.
This study borrows from Bowen, Chen, and Eraslan (2014), who model mandatory
spending in a legislative bargaining framework and discuss its efficiency relative to dis-
cretionary spending. Similar to these authors, we consider an economy with political
frictions in the form of political turnover and polarization and we assert that mandatory
spending allows to achieve political compromise in the context of public good provision.
Differently from these authors, in our model the output is endogenously determined,
which allows us to analyze the consequences of mandatory spending for macroeconomic
volatility.
This paper is related to a large literature that recognizes political institutions as a
cause of inefficient government policies and a channel of policies’ impact on macroe-
conomic volatility. Acemoglu et al. (2003) demonstrate the existence of institutions-
policies-volatility link empirically using the historically determined component of insti-
tutions to identify causality in a cross section of countries. A number of theoretical stud-
ies use political frictions to explain procyclicality of government expenditures (Ilzetski,
2011; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Woo, 2009); higher that socially optimal
public debt and taxes (Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Yared, 2010); under-accumulation
of physical capital and public over-spending (Azzimonti, 2011; Azzimonti, 2015). Fatás
and Mihov (2003, 2006) provide empirical evidence that governments that intensively
rely on discretionary spending induce significant macroeconomic volatility. Institutional
arrangements that constrain discretion allow to reduce macroeconomic volatility, even
though the ability of governments to react to business cycle fluctuations can be also
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reduced.
This paper is related to the literature on the possible causes of the decline in macroe-
conomic volatility in the mid 1980s – the Great Moderation. Stock and Watson (2003),
Bernanke (2004), Summers (2005), and Galí and Gambetti (2009), among many others,
discuss three possible explanations of the Great Moderation: structural changes in the
economy, better monetary policy, and “good luck.” In this work we suggest that better
fiscal policy could also have contributed to the decline in the U.S. output volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the trends in the
U.S. data on political polarization, mandatory and discretionary government spending,
and output volatility during 1962–2015. Section 3 presents a model that combines
these variables in a dynamic political economy framework. Section 4 evaluates the
contribution of mandatory spending and political polarization to output volatility in the
model, compares it to the U.S. data, and conducts several counterfactual experiments.
Section 5 concludes and discusses several possible extensions.
2 The Data
In this section, we review the recent trends that have characterized the behavior of public
spending and its mandatory and discretionary components, political polarization, and
macroeconomic volatility in the U.S between 1962 and 2015. The data sources are as
follows. Political polarization measure is taken from Poole and Rosenthal (2000). The
original time-series of political polarization are bi-annual, we transform the data to the
annual frequency using linear interpolation. The data on public spending and GDP is
from the U.S. Government Budget historical tables. There, mandatory and discretionary
outlays are explicitly defined and reported on annual basis starting from year 1962. As a
measure of total government spending, we use the sum of mandatory and discretionary
outlays, excluding net interest payments. The output volatility is measured as the
standard deviation of output growth over five-year rolling window periods.
Figure (1) presents the time-series of mandatory spending as a share of total gov-
ernment spending, total government spending as a share of GDP, and political polar-
ization (on the left axis) and the time-series of the measure of output volatility (on
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Figure 1: Political polarization, mandatory spending, and output growth volatility in
the U.S.
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the right axis). Both the political polarization and the mandatory spending increased
significantly between 1960 and 2015. In particular, the degree of political polarization
increased from 0.505 to 0.976, with the major rise occuring after 1985. The fraction of
mandatory spending in total government spending increased from around 27% to 66%.
The share of total government spending in the GDP accounted for approximately 18%
and did not change significantly during 1962–2015.
The output volatility decreased over the same time period. This reduction in output
volatility, after the 1980s as compared with pre-1980s, has been documented in the
literature as the “Great Moderation.” We follow the literature and split the data into
pre- and post-1985 subperiods to compute the moments that characterize our variables of
interest. Table (1) reports the results. The volatility is computed as the average standard
deviation of output growth over five-year rolling window periods, corresponding to the
variable depicted in Figure (1), and the standard deviation of output detrended with
HP (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) filter using the smoothing parameter 100. On average,
the volatility decreased by around 25%, the share of mandatory spending increased by
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50%, and polarization increased by 38% between the two subperiods.
Table 1: The U.S. data moments, 1962–2015.
1962–1984 1985–2015
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Polit. polarization 0.544 0.019 0.740 0.108
Mandatory spend./Total spend,in % 40.00 9.406 57.56 4.716
Total spend/GDP, in % 17.93 1.299 18.16 1.885
Volatility of GDP growth 0.029 0.006 0.016 0.006
GDP HP-filtered 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.029
Note: The first two columns report statistics for time period 1962–1984; the last two columns report
statistics for time period 1985–2015. Government spending and output are from Historical Tables of
the United States Government Budget; political polarization is from Poole and Rosenthal (2000). The
output volatility is measured as the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth over five-year
rolling window periods and as the standard deviation of the HP-filtered (with smoothing parameter
100) logarithm of real GDP per capita.
Next, we consider a dynamic political economy model that combines the variables
described in Figure (1) and Table (1). We use the model to investigate whether the
changes in the structure of government spending and/or political polarization can ex-
plain any of the reduction in output volatility documented in Table (1).
3 The Model
Consider a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy populated by two types of agents, L
and R, of equal measure with total population normalized to one. While they have
identical income, the two types of agents have different preferences over the size of the
public sector.2 The instantaneous utility of type h ∈ L,R agent j is the following:
2Given that there is no income inequality, the differences in preferences are driven by ideological
rather than economic motives.
6
u(cj, nj) + λhv(G), (1)
where cj denotes the agent’s consumption of private goods, nj denotes labor hours,
and G denotes aggregate public spending. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huff-
man (1988), we assume that preferences over consumption and labor satisfy
u(c, n) = log
(
c− 1
ϕ
n1+
1

1 + 1

)
, (2)
where  is the elasticity of labor. Agents discount the future at rate β ∈ [0, 1).
There are infinitely many competitive firms that produce a single consumption good
and hire labor each period so as to maximize profits. Firms have access to a technology
linear in labor:
y = n, (3)
where n is the aggregate labor hours and labor productivity is normalized to one.3 Given
that the firms are competitive, the wage rate is equal to one.
The government raises revenues via a proportional tax τ that is chosen every period,
so private consumption is
cj = (1− τ)nj. (4)
Tax revenues are used to finance the provision of public goods. The government budget
constraint is
G = τn. (5)
Combining the public and private sectors of the economy, the economy resource
constraint reads as follows:
c+G = n, (6)
where c denotes aggregate private consumption.
Competitive firms decide how much labor to hire given wages. Agents choose con-
sumption and leisure, taking wages and government policy as given. It is convenient to
formulate government policy in terms of tax rate rather than public spending and let
3We could add exogenous stochastic process for labor productivity and evaluate how mandatory
spending reduces volatility due to the exogenous productivity shocks. This is not the main question of
the paper and is therefore left for future research.
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the aggregate public spending adjust to balance the government budget. A competitive
equilibrium given government policy is defined below.
A competitive equilibrium given government policy τ , is a set of allocations, {cj(τ), nj(τ)},
prices w(τ), and public spending G(τ) such that:
(i). Agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. Agent j’s labor supply
satisfies
u1(cj(τ), nj(τ))(1− τ)w + u2(cj(τ), nj(τ)) = 0,
where
cj(τ) = (1− τ)wnj(τ).
(ii). Firms maximize profits, so w = 1.
(iii). Markets clear: n(τ) =
∫
j
nj(τ).
(iv). The government budget constraint is satisfied: G(τ) = τn(τ).
Given the additive separability of the utility derived from the provision of public
goods, the solution to the agent maximization problem is independent of the agent’s
type. Hence, we can think of the competitive equilibrium as characterized by the deci-
sions of a representative agent with nj(τ) = n(τ) and cj(τ) = c(τ). Given the assumed
utility functions, the optimal allocations resulting from the agent maximization problem
are as follows:
c(τ) = (1− τ)1+, (7)
n(τ) = (1− τ). (8)
Next, we characterize the government policy.
3.1 Government Policy
The role of the government in this economy is to provide public goods. Given the
disagreement between groups over the size of the public sector, political parties will
endogenously arise in a democratic environment (Azzimonti, 2015). There are two
parties, L and R, representing each group in the population and competing for office
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every period. The probability of winning the election conditional of being in power
during the last period is P ≥ 0.5 and the probability of loosing the election to the
opposition is 1− P .4
The total government spending G consists of mandatory and discretionary public
expenditures:
G = g + x, (9)
where g denotes mandatory public spending and x denotes discretionary public spending.
The two types of public expenditures are combined in the agent’s utility as follows:
v(G) = θ log(g) + (1− θ) log(x+ x0), (10)
where θ is the relative weight on mandatory versus discretionary spending, and x0 is a
constant. The presence of x0 > 0 ensures that the utility is bounded when x = 0.
The elected party chooses the tax rate and the allocation of government resources
between mandatory and discretionary spending so as to maximize the utility of its own
type. There is no disagreement about the composition of public spending, therefore
for both parties the optimal mandatory and discretionary spending are fractions θ and
1− θ, respectively, of the total government spending, adjusted by the constant x0:
g(τ) = θG(τ) + θx0, (11)
x(τ) = (1− θ)G(τ)− θx0. (12)
Under these choices of mandatory and discretionary spending, the utility from the total
government spending simplifies as follows:
v(G(τ)) = log(G(τ) + x0) + log(θ
θ(1− θ)1−θ). (13)
The parties agree on the composition but disagree on the size of public sector and
therefore, will impose different tax rates. The distinction between mandatory and dis-
cretionary public spending combined with the disagreement on the total size of public
sector are the main drivers of the results highlighted in this paper.
4Azzimonti (2011) endogenizes the probability P in a voting model in which the outcome of the
election is dictated by political preference shock as well as voters’ expectations about the economic
outcomes.
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Discretionary spending is defined as expenditure that is governed by annual or other
periodic appropriations. Mandatory spending is defined as expenditure that is governed
by law, rather than by periodic appropriations. We follow the modeling approach by
Bowen, Chen and Eraslan (2014) to account for different legislative requirements behind
the changes in these public spending components. In particular, we assume that the
party in power chooses the current public spending, g and x, subject to the approval by
the opposition (the party which lost the elections) with the alternative being the status
quo.5 The status quo consists of the previous period level of mandatory spending,
which we denote by s, and zero discretionary spending. The opposition approves the
incumbent policy if its utility from that policy is greater than that under the status quo.
We assume that the opposition party always accept the policy suggested by the party
in power if it is indifferent between acceptance and rejection. Then, in equilibrium all
the proposals are accepted.
Given that the optimal mandatory and discretionary spending are the constant frac-
tions of total tax revenues, it proves more convenient in the subsequent analysis to
re-formulate the status quo in terms of mandatory and discretionary spending into the
status quo in terms of tax rate and discretionary spending. In particular, we consider
the government policy as the choice of the tax rate by the incumbent, subject to the
approval by the opposition with the status quo being the previous period tax rate, which
we denote by τs, and zero discretionary spending. There is correspondence between τs
and s as follows: s = θ(τs(1− τs) +x0). The tax rate required to finance the status quo
mandatory spending s, which we denote by η(τs), can be computed from the government
budget constraint as follows:
η(τs)(1− η(τs)) = θ(τs(1− τs) + x0). (14)
The instantaneous utility derived from the public sector under the status quo ex-
penditures is given by:
v(G(τs)) = θ log(θτs(1− τs) + θx0) + (1− θ) log(x0). (15)
5Thus, we consider a political system with unanimity rule. As in Bowen, Chen and Eraslan (2014),
we justify this assumption by the fact that many political systems have institutions that limit a single
party’s power, for example, the “checks and balances” included in the U.S. Constitution. Under these
institutions, if the majority party’s power is not suffciently high, then it needs approval of the other
party to set new policies (Bowen, Chen and Eraslan, 2014).
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3.2 Markov-perfect equilibrium
There is no commitment technology, so promises made by any party before elections are
not credible unless they are optimal ex-post. As nicely explained in Klein, Krusell, and
Rios-Rull (2008) and Azzimonti (2015), among other related studies, the party in power
plays a game against the opposition, taking the opposition policy as given. We focus on
Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE), defined as a set of strategies that depend only on the
current, payoff-relevant state of the economy. Given that the firms and agents problems
are static, and the government budget constraint includes only contemporaneous vari-
ables, the status quo level of taxes, τs, is the only endogenous payoff-relevant state of
the economy. The other, exogenous, state variable is the identity of the party in power.
The party in power decides on the optimal policy knowing that it will be replaced by
the opposition with probability 1−P and given the legislative requirements behind the
changes in mandatory and discretionary spending. The value function of type h agent
when his party is in power will be denoted by Vh(τs) and when his party is out of power
by Wh(τs).
Suppose party L is in power. Its objective function in the current period is given by:
max
τ
u(c(τ), n(τ)) + λLv(G(τ)) + β(PVL(τ
′
s) + (1− P )WL(τ ′s)) (16)
s.t. : u(c(τ), n(τ)) + λRv(G(τ)) + β(PWR(τ
′
s) + (1− P )VR(τ ′s)) ≥
(1− λR)u(c(η(τs), n(η(τs))) + λR[θ log(θτs(1− τs) + θx0) + (1− θ) log(x0)] +
β(pWR(η(τs)) + (1− p)VR(η(τs))), (17)
τ ′s = τ, η(τs)(1− η(τs)) = θ(τs(1− τs) + x0). (18)
where c(τ) and n(τ) are given by (7) and (8), respectively, and G(τ) = τn(τ).
Political Equilibrium: An equilibrium satisfies
i. Given the value functions Vh and Wh with h ∈ {L,R}, and competitive equilibrium
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allocations, the party h’s policy function Th(τs) satisfy:
{Th(τs)} ∈ arg max
τ
u(c(τ), n(τ)) + λhv(G(τ)) + β(PVh(τ
′
s) + (1− P )Wh(τ ′s))
s.t. : u(c(τ), n(τ)) + λ¬hv(G(τ)) + β(PW¬h(τ ′s) + (1− P )V¬h(τ ′s)) ≥
u(c(η(τs)), n(η(τs))) + λ¬h[θ log(τsn(τs) + θx0) + (1− θ) log(x0)] +
β(pW¬h(η(τs)) + (1− p)V¬h(η(τs))),
τ ′s = τ,
η(τs)(1− η(τs)) = θ(τs(1− τs) + x0).
ii. Given the policy functions TL(τs) and TR(τs) and competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions, the value functions Vh and Wh with h ∈ {L,R} satisfy functional equations:
Vh(τs) = u(c(Th(τs)), n(Th(τs))) + λhv(G(Th(τs))) +
β(PVh(Th(τs)) + (1− P )Wh(Th(τs))),
Wh(τs) = u(c(T¬h(τs)), n(T¬h(τs))) + λhv(G(T¬h(τs))) +
β(PVh(T¬h(τs)) + (1− P )Wh(T¬h(τs))).
iii. Given the value and policy functions, consumption and labor constitute competitive
equilibrium allocations.
Next, we characterize incumbent h’s optimal choices, the role of the status quo
constraint imposed by the legislative requirements behind the choice of mandatory public
spending, and equilibrium dynamics of the economy.
3.3 Characterization
The disagreement between the two agent types about the public sector size implies that
the two parties prefer different tax rates. We measure the magnitude of this disagreement
by the absolute value of the difference between the relative weights the two types of
agents put on the public versus private consumption, λL and λR. We refer to this
difference as the degree of political polarization in the economy. Equal weights imply
that there is no political polarization in the society; greater |λL − λR| corresponds to
greater political polarization.
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Without the status quo constraint imposed by the legislative requirements on the
choice of mandatory public spending, the problem of the government would be static
and the optimal fiscal policy would consist of tax rates proportional to the weights λL
and λR. Given exogenous political turnover and the fact that the allocations and output
are functions of government policy, the economy would be characterized by fluctuations
due to political changes. Greater political polarization would imply greater fluctuations
due to political changes as in Azzimonti and Talbert (2014).
The status quo constraint, when binding, forces the party in power to choose the
policy closer to that preferred by the opposition. To see this, notice that both parties
enjoy higher utility when the tax rate is closer to their unconstrained optimal taxes.
This implies that the tax rates chosen under the binding status quo constraint lie in
the interval restricted by the tax rates that would be chosen if there were no status quo
constraint. The fluctuations due to political changes are therefore of smaller magni-
tude under the (at least occasionally) binding status quo constraint. We formalize this
intuition below.
We assume without loss of generality that λR < λL and we denote by τ ?h the tax rate
that would be chosen by the party h if there were no status quo constraint. Given the
competitive equilibrium allocations, this tax can be found from the first order conditions
associated with unconstrained government maximization problem (16). In particular,
after substituting the functional forms, the unrestricted tax τ ?h is defined by the following
equation:
λh(1− τ ?h)(1− τ ?h(1 + ))− (1 + )(τ ?h(1− τ ?h) + x0) = 0, h ∈ {L,R}. (19)
The instantaneous utility is concave in τ and the set defined by the status quo
constraint is compact. Therefore, the value functions are concave in the interval where
the status quo constraint is binding. The value functions are constants that depend on
τ ?L and τ ?R for the values of state variable for which the constraint is not binding.
Proposition 1: Introducing the status quo constraint reduces politically-driven volatil-
ity.
Proof is relegated to Appendix.
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The status quo constraint, specifying the level of mandatory spending that must
be followed if there is no agreement between the parties on the fiscal plan, serves as
a guarantee of some reservation utility level for the opposition. It induces the party
in power to set the tax rate closer to that preferred by the opposition and, through
the impact of fiscal policy on allocations and output, reduces the politically-driven
fluctuations in the economy.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, the tax rates τs lie in the interval [τ ?R; τ ?L].
The dynamics of the economy depends non-trivially on the parameters of the model,
θ, x0, and λL and λR. The constant x0 is fixed and defines the set of tax rates for
which the constraint is binding. Higher x0 implies that the reservation utility of the
opposition is higher, which increases the bargaining power of the opposition. Thus,
higher x0 corresponds to a larger set of status quo tax rates (or mandatory spending
levels) for which the constraint is binding.
We characterize the influence of the weight on mandatory spending, θ, and of political
polarization, λL − λR, on the equilibrium policies for a particular case when β = 0 in
the proposition below.
Proposition 2. Assume β = 0 and the status quo constraint is (at least occasionally)
binding. Keeping other parameters constant, higher weight on mandatory spending, θ,
leads to more binding status quo constraint. Keeping other parameters constant, higher
political polarization, λL − λR, leads to more binding status quo constraint.
Proof is relegated to Appendix.
Corollary 2. Assume β = 0 and the status quo constraint is (at least occasionally)
binding. Keeping other parameters constant, higher weight on mandatory spending, θ,
reduces politically-driven volatility. Keeping other parameters constant, higher political
polarization, λL − λR, reduces politically-driven volatility.
If the status constraint does not bind, the changes in θ affect only the fraction of
mandatory spending in total government spending, without any consequences for the
volatility or the level of taxes. For binding status quo, higher θ implies that mandatory
spending is more important for both parties, and therefore, the bargaining power of
the opposition is greater. This leads to smaller differences between the policies chosen
14
Figure 2: Policy Functions and the Status Quo Constraint
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Note: Figure presents the policy functions for party R (grey line) and party L (dashed line) for
θ=0.01, 0.13, and 0.25 in the first, second, and third graph, respectively. The remaining parameters
are as follows: λR= 1.6475, λL=2.7621, x0=0.2234, β = 0.95, P = 0.83.
by different parties, and therefore, lower volatility due to political frictions. Similar
intuition applies to the changes in political polarization, λL − λR.
Our numerical simulations suggest that the results outlined in Proposition 2 and
Corollary 2 also hold for general case with β ∈ [0, 1). Figure (2) presents the policy
functions for three different values of θ, keeping other parameters constant. For low
values of θ, the equilibrium is characterized by unrestricted policies as neither party
faces binding constraint when choosing its tax rate. For the intermediate levels of θ,
only the party L’s constraint is binding. For high values of θ, both parties face binding
status quo constraint. The pattern is very similar for different values of λL−λR, keeping
other parameters constant. The impact of an increase in political polarization, λL−λR,
on output volatility depends on whether the status quo constraint is binding. When
the status quo constraint does not bind, greater polarization leads to more divergent
policies and higher volatility. When the status quo constraint is binding, an increase
in polarization makes the status quo restriction more important for negotiations and
brings the party L’s and R’s tax rates closer together. The value functions resemble
policy functions and therefore, are not shown on the graph.
Importantly, change in any of the parameters affect all the variables. For example, an
increase in political polarization leads to an increase in the average fraction of mandatory
spending and lower average total government spending (or lower income taxes). This is
the consequence of the strategic behavior of the party in power: in more polarized society,
15
where the status quo constraint is frequently binding, it is optimal for the incumbent
to choose more mandatory spending, and in this way to increase its reservation utility
and bargaining power for the next period, when it may not be re-elected.
We quantify the impact of political polarization and mandatory spending on macroe-
conomic volatility controlling for the level of taxes and total government expenditures
in a calibrated version of the model in the next section.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model and test whether the changes in political polar-
ization, |λL−λR|, and/or changes in the fraction of mandatory spending, θ, can explain
any of the reduction in output volatility reported in Table (1).
We solve the model using value functions iterations on the grid of states. This is
a convenient numerical approach given that the value function is nondifferentiable at
some points (at which the status quo constraint becomes binding).
4.1 Calibration
A time period represents a year. We use the discount factor β = 0.95 and the probability
of re-election P = 0.83 as in Azzimonti and Talbert (2014).
For convenience, we translate the parameters characterizing the weights that the two
types of agents put on their utility from the public sector, λL and λR, into the average
economy-wide weight on the public sector, λ, and polarization measure, ∆, as follows:
λR = λ−∆, λL = λ+ ∆. (20)
We are interested in the following moments from the U.S. data: the average fraction
of mandatory spending in total government spending, the average fraction of total public
spending in the GDP, and the average volatility of output, computed over the subperiods
before and after 1985, as reported in Table (1). We ask how much of the change in these
moments between the two subperiods can be accounted for by the change in the weight
on mandatory spending, θ and/or the change in political polarization, ∆.
Note that these three moments are not mutually independent in the model, therefore,
we can match only two of them. In particular, we choose λ, ∆ and θ together to match
16
the average volatility of output and the average fraction of mandatory spending in
total government spending in the U.S. over the first subperiod, 1962–1984. Given these
parameters, the value of parameter x0 defines the subset of state variables for which the
status quo constraint is binding.
Theoretically, there exists a range of x0 for which the status quo constraint is never
binding, occasionally binding for one party, occasionally binding for both parties, always
binding for one party, and always binding for both parties. The only restriction imposed
on x0 by the model is that its value is such that the level of discretionary spending defined
by equation (12) is positive.
In calibration, the value of x0 jointly with λ, ∆ and θ influences the moments of
interest. This fact implies that the range of x0-s which are relevant for the U.S. data
moments is significantly restricted. In particular, we could not find a value of x0 such
that the moments of interest are replicated by the model and both parties have (at least
occasionally) binding status quo constraint. Therefore, we proceed with the analysis for
a value of x0 for which only party L’s status quo constraint is always or occasionally
binding.
The implications of the model depend on whether the status quo constraint is bind-
ing. We do not know whether this constraint was binding for the U.S. economy during
1962–1984. We consider three possibilities and compare the outcomes to evaluate how
relevant is the status quo constraint for explanation of the data reported in Figure (1)
and Table (1).
First, we choose x0 (together with λ, ∆, θ to match the moments of interest for
subperiod 1962–1984) so that party L’s status quo always binds. This is our baseline
calibration.
Second, we use the same value of x0 and adjust λ and θ so that the two moments of
interest (output volatility and the fraction of mandatory spending in the first subperiod)
are still replicated by the model but party L’s status quo constraint does not bind. It
becomes occasionally binding when the fraction of mandatory spending increases, as in
the second subperiod of the U.S. data.
Third, we again use the same x0 and assume that there is no particular legislative
regulations for mandatory spending, so that the party in power does not face the status
quo constraint. In this third case, we again adjust λ and θ so that the two moments of
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value when L’s status quo binds Target (in U.S. data over 1962–1984)
always; occasionally; never
β 0.95 Azzimonti and Talbert (2014)
P 0.83 Azzimonti and Talbert (2014)
λ 2.2048; 1.7703; 1.7703 tax rate ≈ 0.18
∆ 0.5573 st.dev(output growth)=0.033
θ 0.1144; 0.1343; 0.1343 mean(Mand. spend/Total spend)=0.4
x0 0.2234 100%;50%;0% of states are binding for party L
interest (output volatility and the fraction of mandatory spending in the first subperiod)
are matched by the model. Note that party R’s constraint is never binding in all three
calibrations.
The parameter values corresponding to the three cases and the targeted moments
are reported in Table (2).
Having obtained the parameter values, we evaluate the impact of a change in political
polarization, reflected in the change in ∆, and the impact of a change in the fraction of
mandatory spending, reflected in the change in ∆ and/or θ, on output volatility, keeping
the share of total government spending in output constant as in the data (by adjusting
parameter λ), and assuming that the only source of economic fluctuations is political
turnover. The results are reported below.
4.2 Polarization, Mandatory Spending, and Volatility
We now compare the data from the first and second subperiods, as reported in Table (1).
The fraction of mandatory spending increased from around 40% to around 60% while
the fraction of total government spending in output, corresponding to the tax rate in the
model, stayed the same. The output volatility decreased and the political polarization
increased by 38% in the second subperiod compared with the first one. Can these trends
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Table 3: Counterfactual Experiments: The impact of Polarization and Mandatory
Spending on Volatility.
Experiment Output volatility
with L’s status quo binding always occasionaly never
θ increases to match g/G = 0.6 0.0245 0.0297 0.0330
∆ increases by 38% and θ increases
to match g/G = 0.6
0.0252 0.0309 0.0445
∆ increases to match g/G = 0.6 0.0142* 0.0423* 0.0788*
Note: Each row reports the output volatility computed as the average standard deviation of simulated
and HP-filtered output series. In the experiments, λ is adjusted so that the tax rate stays the same as
in the first subperiod, corresponding to the calibration reported in Table (2).
*The admisible change in λ is not sufficient to maintain the tax rate as in the first subperiod,
corresponding to the calibration reported in Table (2).
be related to the legislative requirements behind the structure of government spending,
as outlined in our model?
We conduct three counterfactual experiments and evaluate the consequences for the
calibrations featuring always, occasionally, and never binding status quo constraint of
party L.
First, we increase the weight on mandatory spending, θ, so that the fraction of
mandatory spending in total government spending increases from 40% to 60%, as in the
data. At the same time, we adjust λ so that the fraction of total government spending in
output (corresponding to tax rate in the model) stays constant, as in the two subperiods
in the data (the value in the model is around 0.12 rather than 0.18 in the data). We
keep political polarization constant in this experiment.
The results for output volatility are reported in the first row of Table (3). When
party L’s status quo constraint is binding on the whole state space (the first column of
Table (3)), output volatility decreases from 0.0330 to 0.0245. When there is no status
quo constraint imposed on the parties competing for government and their policy choices
are unrestricted, the output volatility is not affected by the change in preferences for
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mandatory spending (the third column of Table (3)). In this case there is no legislative
distinction between mandatory and discretionary spending and the only impact of a
change in θ is a change in the composition of public spending. In the intermediate case,
the status quo constraint is not binding when the fraction of public spending is 40% but
it becomes occasionally binding when the fraction of mandatory spending increases to
60%. As a consequence, the output volatility decreases but by less than in the case of
always binding contraint. In particular, the volatility decreases from 0.0330 to 0.0297
when the status quo constraint is occasionally binding.
In the second experiment, we increase the political polarization by 38%, as in the
data, and we let the weight on mandatory spending adjust to accommodate further
necessary increase in the fraction of mandatory spending. Again, we adjust λ to keep
the tax rate the same as in the first subperiod. The results are reported in second row
of Table (3). For always or occasionally binding status quo constraint, an increase in
political polarization combined with an increase in the fraction of mandatory spending
leads to a smaller decline in output volatility as compared with the first experiment. This
is because an increase in polarization moves the tax rates preferred by the two parties
further apart. If there were no status quo constraint, this rise in political polarization
would cause a significant increase in output volatility, as the one reported in colunm
(1): from 0.0330 to 0.0445 in the first and second subperiods, respectively. Given that
in the data there was a simultaneous increase in political polarization and a decline in
volatility, we can conclude that the status quo constraint is an important determinant
of fiscal policy outcomes.
Finally, in the third experiment we ask whether a rise in political polarization could
account for a rise in the share of mandatory spending in the U.S. in the second subperiod.
We increase ∆ to match the fraction of mandatory spending in total governmment
spending, 60%, keeping θ constant. In this case, the attempt to adjust λ to keep the
tax rate constant was not successful, therefore the results are reported for tax rates
lower than those corresponding to the calibration in Table (2). The third row of Table
(3) reports the output volatility obtained in this experiment. When the status quo
constraint always binds, the volatility decreases to 0.0142; while it increases to 0.0423
and 0.0788 when the status quo constraint occasionally or never binds, respectively. This
third experiment is helpful to evaluate the role of political polarization for the fraction
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of mandatory spending: growing polarization leads to higher fraction of mandatory
spending even if the preferences for mandatory spending are unchanged.
What is the main message of the above experiments? The institutional restrictions
on budgetary process could significantly reduce the politically-driven fluctuations in fis-
cal policy outcomes. If these fluctuations constituted the only source of macroeconomic
volatility, the legislative requirements behind the changes in mandatory spending could
reduce or even neutralize the negative consequences of political frictions for macroecon-
omy.
5 Conclusion
We presented a model where the institutional restrictions on budgetary process reduce
the divergence of the policies set by political parties that disagree on the size of the
government and alternate in power. The restrictions consist of the legislative require-
ment for the incumbent and the opposition to agree on the structure of public spending,
including its mandatory and discretionary components. Without the agreement, the
status quo policy is implemented. We showed that such organization of the budgetary
process implies that the impact of political frictions on macroeconomic volatility is sig-
nificantly reduced. Our model can explain why macroeconomic volatility can fall jointly
with an increase in the political polarization.
This paper aimed to present the results in a concise form, leaving several promising
extensions for further research. One extension would be to add exogenous productivity
shock and evaluate the impact of the status quo constraint on the macroeconomic volatil-
ity in the presence of exogenous fluctuations in productivity. Intuitively, the mechanism
would be similar to the one discussed in this paper: the response of the policies set
by the opposing parties to exogenous shock would be less divergent under the status
quo constraint. Such an extension would be interesting in terms of quantitative eval-
uation of how much of macroeconomic volatility caused by productivity shocks could
be explained by the institutional restrictions in the form of the constraint considered in
this paper. Another extension would be to add public debt to the model, which could
serve as an additional tool in the political game. Another important extension would
be to add physical capital and to evaluate the importance of mandatory spending in
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developed and developing countries. The absence of the legislative requirements behind
the mandatory spending or the lack of enforcement of such requirements could be a
potential explanation of more pronounced business cycles in developing countries (dis-
cussed by Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014) and, perhaps, could add to the explanation of
procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We compare the stationary equilibrium polices with and without the status quo
constraint. Without the status quo constraint, the L and R parties choose their optimal
taxes τ ?L and τ ?R, respectively. Assume that party R is in power. The status quo τs is
binding when
WL(τ
?
R) ≤ WL(η(τs)). (21)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (14), obtain that η(τs) is increasing in τs.
Given concavity of W , it must hold that η(τs) < τ ?L. Given the concavity of V and the
fact that τ ?h is continuous and increasing in λh, the following inequalities hold:
VR(τ
?
L) < VR(η(τs)) < VR(τ
?
R), (22)
τ ?R < η(τs) < τ
?
L. (23)
Thus, the optimal policy for party R when the status quo constraint is binding is to
choose τˆR ∈ (τ ?R, η(τs)].
Same logic applies when the party L is in power. Its optimal strategy under the
binding status quo constraint is to choose τˆL ∈ [η(τs), τ ?L).
Given that the volatility of output, labor, consumption, and taxes in this economy
is defined by the difference of the tax rates implemented by different parties in power,
we conclude that the economy with the status quo constraint is less volatile that the
economy without such constraint, given that |τˆL − τˆR| < |τ ?L − τ ?R|.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The status quo constraint is a function of τs and parameters. After substituting
the consumption and labor functions, it reads:
F (τs; θ, x0, λh, λ¬h) = log(1− τ)1+ + λ¬h log(τ(1− τ) + x0) + λ¬h log(θθ(1− θ)1−θ)−
− log(1− η(τs; θ, x0))1+ − λ¬hθ log(θτs(1− τs) + θx0)− λ¬h(1− θ) log(x0).
We aim to show that F (τs; θ, x0, λh, λ¬h) is decreasing in θ. From (19), τθ = 0. Applying
the implicit function theorem to (14), we obtain dη
dx0
= − −θ
(1−η)−1(1−η(1+)) > 0. Then,
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∂F (τs;θ,x0,λh,λ¬h)
∂θ
= −λ¬h log (1−θ)τs(1−τs)+x0x0 −λ¬h < 0, because
(1−θ)τs(1−τs)+x0
x0
> 1, given
that discretionary spending must be positive: (1− θ)τs(1− τs) − θx0 > 0.
We next aim to show that F (τs; θ, x0, λh, λ¬h) is decreasing in polarization, (λh−λ¬h).
From (19), dτh
dλh
> 0. From (14), η does no depend on (λh − λ¬h). We can rewrite
the status quo constraint as follows: F (τs; θ, x0, λh, λ¬h) = u(τh, λ¬h) + λ¬hv(G(τh)) −
u(τs, λ¬h) − λ¬hv(G(τs)). Then, ∂F (τs;θ,x0,λh,λ¬h)∂(λh−λ¬h) = (u(τs, λ¬h)τh + λ¬hvτh)
dτh
(λh−λ¬h) +
dλ¬h
(λh−λ¬h)(v(G(τh))− v(G(τs)).
i). Assume party L is on power. Given that λL − λR > 0, λh − λ¬h > 0 and
dτh
(λh−λ¬h) > 0. For the opposition, the unrestricted tax rate preferred by the incumbent
is too high, therefore (u(τs, λ¬h)τh + λ¬hvτh) < 0. Finally, (v(G(τL))− v(G(τs)) > 0, as
τL > τs (from Proposition 1) and dλ¬h(λh−λ¬h) < 0. Therefore,
∂F (τs;θ,x0,λL,λR)
∂(λL−λR) < 0.
ii). Assume now that party R is on power. Given that λR−λL > 0, λh−λ¬h < 0 and
dτh
(λh−λ¬h) < 0. For the opposition, the unrestricted tax rate preferred by the incumbent
is too low, therefore (u(τs, λ¬h)τh + λ¬hvτh) > 0. Finally, (v(G(τL)) − v(G(τs)) < 0, as
τR < τs (from Proposition 1) and dλ¬h(λh−λ¬h) > 0. Therefore,
∂F (τs;θ,x0,λR,λL)
∂(λR−λL) < 0.
Combining i) and ii), we conclude that ∂F (τs;θ,x0,λh,λ¬h)
∂(λh−λ¬h) < 0.
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